The Growing Challenges Faced by Forcibly Displaced Afghans in Germany
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2026), Germany ranks third worldwide among host countries for refugees and is the largest in the European Union. Over the past decade in particular, Germany has become a major resettlement country for Afghans, who – after people from Ukraine and Syria – now constitute the third-largest displaced group in the country. Moreover, among Western nations, Germany is the most important host country for displaced Afghans with approximately 350,000 Afghans living in Germany as of December 2024 (Mediendienst Integration, 2026). The sequence of events commonly referred to in Western media as the “War on Terror,” triggered large-scale displacement from the country, ultimately resulting in one of the largest refugee movements toward Europe since the Second World War. Between 2015 and 2020, a total of 204,182 asylum applications were submitted by Afghan nationals in Germany (German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees [BAMF], 2023). An additional 59,634 applications were filed in 2021 and 2022, reflecting a renewed increase in Afghan asylum seekers, which has begun to decline again since early 2025 (BAMF, 2025).
What are emerging challenges for Afghan well-being and protection in Germany?
To fully understand the challenges forcibly displaced Afghans faced upon arrival in Germany, it is essential to consider not only the context of war in Afghanistan, but also the key historical events and political decisions within the European Union over the past decade—particularly those shaping and constraining forced migration routes. Until 2016, many Afghans reached Central and Western Europe via the so-called “Balkan route,” passing through Greece, North Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia (Šabić, 2005). Following the closure of national borders along this route in the same year, migration pathways shifted toward the dangerous Mediterranean sea crossings to Greece and Italy. This route has been associated with high mortality rates at sea and abuse by smuggling networks and human traffickers, as well as violence by border officials during transit. These traumatic experiences often become particularly salient after arrival in the host country (Hess & Petrogiannis, 2020; EL-Awad et al., 2025). Displaced Afghans arriving in Germany show high prevalence rates of mental health problems, particularly post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety disorders (Koch et al., 2020). They are further confronted with migration-related stressors arising from their legal status and the new sociocultural environment, including language barriers, financial hardship due to bureaucratic and institutional obstacles, as well as social isolation and loneliness – especially among younger age groups (EL-Awad et al., 2021).
How do forcibly displaced Afghans access psychosocial and health care?
While several measures aim to provide psychosocial and other forms of support to Afghans in Germany, these efforts come with substantial limitations. Access to health care is restricted for most newly arrived forcibly displaced people during their first 36 months and is limited to acute emergencies that require formal application according to the German Asylum Seekers’ Benefits Act (AsylbLG). After this period, forcibly displaced Afghans usually become eligible for standard social benefits, although this is not granted automatically. Hence, especially during the first months after arrival, regular health care coverage is often unavailable. However, especially since 2015, “psychosocial centers” – the PSZs – have been established in many larger cities, offering holistic and multidisciplinary care delivered by teams of psychologists, physicians, social workers, and legal advisors for forcibly displaced people (see Murray, 2016). These services often focus on those with precarious legal status, such as temporary suspension of deportation or rejected asylum claims, whose limited prospects of permanent residence constitute a significant psychological burden.
Nevertheless, the number of forcibly displaced people receiving support in these PSZs remains limited relative to estimated demand, largely due to capacity constraints. In 2023, a total of 29,180 forcibly displaced people received care in PSZs nationwide – the highest number recorded to date – yet this figure represents only 3.3% of those estimated to be in need of psychosocial support (Karato et al., 2025). Another major challenge in this context is the lack of long-term, secure funding for these centers, which largely rely on project-based financing and are particularly affected during periods of political transition. Accordingly, the new German government, formed by the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU, known as the Union) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), announced in October 2025 that funding for PSZs would be reduced by 41% in 2026 (Bundesweite Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Psychosozialen Zentren für Flüchtlinge und Folteropfer, 2025). According to the national association responsible for the PSZs (BAfF), these cuts likely will result in nationwide service suspensions and premature termination of ongoing therapies. Some municipalities in a few German federal states, such as North Rhine-Westphalia, introduced health insurance cards for forcibly displaced people to facilitate their access to medical services several years ago, but these cards are not in use nationwide (Wenner et al., 2020). While state-funded language and integration courses are sometimes mandatory for newly arrived people and may be helpful for greater social and occupational participation under less adverse circumstances, they fall short when it comes to addressing serious and acute psychosocial needs. When forcibly displaced individuals arrive in Germany with severe pre-existing conditions, timely and adequate access to healthcare is essential to enable them to meet social expectations and to fulfill the prerequisites for participation in society. Given the prevailing political emphasis on rapid socio-cultural and, above all, labour market integration, this situation creates a policy inconsistency, as discussed in the following section. At this point, it should be noted that there is broad agreement across Germany’s current political landscape that forcibly displaced people’ future rights of residence will be explicitly tied to gainful employment (Niesmann, 2026). Gainful employment is increasingly becoming a key criterion for long-term residence and social participation, while humanitarian considerations that initially justified their admission appear to receive less policy emphasis.
Moreover, from an integration and health research perspective, the 36-month waiting period for access to standard social and healthcare services poses a significant policy challenge with potentially serious long-term consequences for Afghans (Biddle, 2024). This waiting period delays care during a time when access to care is particularly important, thereby significantly increasing the risk of treatable conditions becoming chronic. Existing mental health disorders, including PTSD and depression, not only remain untreated but actually worsen, often making social participation and coping with everyday life impossible long after the waiting period has expired. At the same time – which contrasts with current policy approaches – ruling conservative parties such as the Union have repeatedly and early on called for forcibly displaced peoples’ self-directed responsibility for integration, especially among those from the Middle East and neighbouring regions (Christian Democratic Party, 2017). However, limited access to health care during this phase also reinforces feelings of powerlessness, insecurity, and frustration, placing affected individuals in a position of significant administrative dependence. Particularly at the local level, where direct decisions regarding the care of forcibly displaced people are made, but where these individuals often lack the linguistic, legal, and institutional resources to assert their rights, this dependence increases the risk of unequal treatment and inequitable outcomes, further deepening the process of marginalization. Overall, the waiting period creates a risk of reinforcing a cycle of deteriorating health, delayed integration, and continued dependency – a cycle that reflects structural features of the current legal framework. Reducing or removing this waiting period could significantly improve early access to care and prevent long-term mental health deterioration. Its continued existence risks undermining individual well-being and weakening the conditions necessary for successful integration. This step must be accompanied by a sustained strengthening of integration-oriented, community-based services. Early equitable access to healthcare and psychosocial support can prevent mental health harms and facilitate integration into German society. Such actions would be consistent with a call for social and labor-market integration of refugees often proposed by political actors.
How do recent policy developments affect forcibly displaced Afghans’ well-being and mental health?
Policy developments since 2025 indicate a shift toward more restrictive asylum policies for forcibly displaced Afghans in Germany. With the new government taking office, Afghans have faced a tightening of restrictions, accompanied by frequent announcements of new legal measures and an increasing threat to their protection status. These developments include the suspension of family reunification for individuals with subsidiary protection status, renewed negotiations with the Taliban to facilitate deportations, and the gradual resumption of return procedures to Afghanistan.
For instance, in July 2025, a law suspending family reunifications for individuals granted subsidiary protection – including Afghan refugees – came into effect without a transitional period. This not only halted new family reunification applications but also suspended those that had been pending for months, or even years (German Bundestag, 2025a). This step was taken despite substantial empirical evidence demonstrating the critical importance of family reunification for mental health – particularly among young, unaccompanied Afghans (see, e.g., EL-Awad et al., 2021). In early 2026, German authorities confirmed the resumption of deportations to Afghanistan, a policy that had been suspended for several years (Der Tagesspiegel, 2026). To facilitate deportations, direct negotiations with the Taliban took place in the autumn of 2025, with the aim of enabling returns not only via charter flights but also through regular commercial flights (Tagesschau, 2025). In addition, the federal government approved the entry and official activity of two Taliban consular officials in Germany in the summer of 2025, a measure intended to support deportation procedures (Tagesschau, 2026a). In the same month that family reunification was suspended, the first deportations under the new government occurred on 18 July 2025, with 81 reportedly returning to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. According to Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt, those deported were described as “serious and most serious offenders” (German Bundestag, 2025b) – rhetoric that risks contributing to the stigmatization of Afghans more broadly in Germany and leaves many questions unanswered about the exact criminal acts of those who were deported. In December 2025 and early 2026, further forcibly displaced Afghans were deported for the first time via commercial flights, suggesting that a formal deportation agreement with the Taliban is now in place (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 2026). As senior figures within Bavaria’s ruling Christian Social Union increasingly call for extending deportations to all refugees, including those without criminal records (Tagesschau, 2026b), such a policy shift raises important policy concerns: not only does this risk contravening Germany’s domestic legal standards, but it also stands in tension with the Geneva Convention’s core obligation to protect those fleeing persecution. Such a deportation agreement may grant the Taliban – a regime widely documented to be responsible for systematic human rights violations – diplomatic legitimacy and set a potentially far-reaching precedent for other European states, contributing to the normalization of international cooperation with the current Afghan authorities. A 2021 study based on interviews with 113 deported Afghan nationals revealed that nearly all participants experienced violence following their return, directly linked to their flight and forced deportation (Stahlmann, 2021). Overall, these developments represent a notable shift from earlier humanitarian policy approaches that emphasized protection for forcibly displaced Afghans as individuals fleeing persecution and violence. For Afghans currently living in Germany, such policy shifts may also have significant psychosocial implications. The prospect of deportation to a country governed by the authorities from whose rule many individuals originally fled may contribute to heightened insecurity, uncertainty, and perceived threat. Post-migration stressors, including fears of deportation and uncertainty regarding legal status, are well documented as key determinants of mental health outcomes among refugees and asylum seekers (see Section 1 of this essay). In this context, cooperation with the de facto authorities in Afghanistan may exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and further undermine refugees’ sense of safety and long-term stability in the host country. For these reasons, the potential psychosocial consequences of deportation policies and cooperation with the Taliban warrant careful reconsideration.
Supporting the well-being, mental health, and integration of forcibly displaced Afghans in Germany requires sustained political commitment to refugee protection and access to health services. A welcoming national and community climate is essential for supporting the resettlement of Afghans in Germany and fostering their integration into society. Creating such a climate requires sustained political commitment to international agreements that protect forcibly displaced peoples’ human rights. Such efforts must include ensuring immediate access to health and social services, enabling early intervention to prevent long-term mental health and physical health difficulties and to promote refugees’ efforts to achieve financial independence, and contribute to their receiving communities. Recent sociopolitical shifts within Germany and the West have weakened the protections and supports previously available to forcibly displaced Afghans, supports that were already insufficient in meeting their needs. Finally, Afghans should be part of the decision making process at multiple levels to ensure that the services and support provided are culturally and contextually appropriate and support the well-being of individuals, families, and communities.
This is part of a three-part series by the Migrants and Displaced Persons (M&DP) Task Force. The three-part series examines how displacement, political instability, and shifting social climates in host countries shape individual and community mental health, while highlighting pathways toward protection, healing, and collective resilience.
Check out Part One: Legal Precarity and the Mental Health of Displaced Afghan Persons in Shifting Policy Contexts
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